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RICO AND THE "OPERATION OR MANAGEMENT" TEST:
THE POTENTIAL CHILLING EFFECT ON CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS
Ira H. Raphaelson*
Michelle D. Bernard**
I. INTRODUCTION
For more than two decades, prosecutors, plaintiffs' lawyers,
the civil and criminal defense bar, and the dourts have strug-
gled with the coverage of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO" or the "Act").1 The Supreme Court
has interpreted the Act many times in both criminal and civil
cases.' For the most part, the high Court has applied the man-
* The authors are attorneys with the law firm of Shaw, Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge in Washington, D.C., who concentrate their practices on corporate compli-
ance matters, civil litigation and the defense of complex white collar criminal cases.
Mr. Raphaelson joined Shaw Pittman in January 1993 after a fifteen year ca-
reer as a state (1978-1980) and federal (1980-1993) prosecutor. Mr. Raphaelson
worked in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Chicago where he concentrated on the prose-
cution of complex white collar crimes. While an Assistant United States Attorney,
Mr. Raphaelson successfully prosecuted six Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations (RICO) matters before juries. He also supervised RICO prosecutions in a dis-
trict that brought more cases and convicted more defendants than any other district
in the country using the RICO statute. Between 1991 and 1993, Mr. Raphaelson
served as the Bush Administration's Special Counsel for Financial Institutions Crime
within the Justice Department as well as Counselor to then Attorney General William
P. Barr.
** Ms. Bernard is an associate at Shaw Pittman, practicing in the areas of white
collar criminal defense, litigation, financial institutions and corporate compliance and
government relations. She is a member of the American Bar Association's White Col-
lar Crime Committee and Section of Business Law, Committee on Criminal Law, and
is co-chair of its Subcommittee on Financial Institution Fraud.
The authors wish to thank J. Mark Gidley, Esquire, counsel with Shaw
Pittman, whose editorial comments were invaluable. The authors also wish to recog-
nize and thank summer associates Kevin Broyles, Andrew Miller and Ian Walker for
their indispensable research and assistance in this endeavor.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
2. E.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993); H.J. Inc. v. Northwest-
ern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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datory "liberal" interpretation language of the law' to expand
the scope of the statute in criminal cases.4 However, in the
civil cases considered, the Supreme Court has generally restrict-
ed the scope of the Act.5
The restriction of RICO in the face of a statutory mandate to
interpret it broadly is particularly surprising for a Court which
has expressed disdain for judicial activism.6 Some commenta-
tors have described RICO as favoring the prosecution.7 This
Article will attempt to examine the recent trend whereby the
Supreme Court restricts RICO as a function of the Court's
dislike of the Act, rather than its traditional method of statuto-
ry construction. Congress created a private cause of action in
RICO hoping to assist prosecutors by creating an economic
incentive and mechanism to involve private citizens in the "war
on crime."' The net result of the private bar's use of RICO and
the Supreme Court's result-oriented narrowing of RICO's scope
will ultimately be an unintended limitation on government use
of the statutory tool.9
Recently, the Supreme Court considered the meaning of the
word "conduct," as a noun and as a verb in the RICO prohibi-
tion provision most often used by prosecutors, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c).' ° The commonly understood English definition of the
word "conduct," when used as a verb, means to "carry on.""
As a noun, it normally means "the way a person acts; behav-
3. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 1970 U.S.C.CA.N.
(84 Stat.) 1104 ("The provisions of this title [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes."). Id.
4. See, e.g., Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1980).
5. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 229.
6. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
7. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 661, 719-23 (1987) (stating that prosecutorial discretion is important to pre-
vent abuse of RICO's broad prohibiting provisions).
8. Norman Abrams, A New Proposal for Limiting Private Civil RICO, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1989).
9. Despite the difference between the Court's interpretive approach in criminal
and civil cases, the holdings from the civil RICO cases extend to criminal cases and
vice versa. The substantive provisions defining RICO violations, 18 U.S.C. § 1962
(1988), is shared for civil and criminal RICO. Civil RICO is, however, enforced
through 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) and criminal RICO through 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988).
10. Reves v. Ernest & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993).
11. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIoNARY 307 (2d ed. 1987).
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ior ...." The definition and use of the word "conduct" under
§ 1962(c) is critical to criminal RICO prosecutions because vir-
tually every act proscribed by § 1962(c) as a verb and a noun is
defined by one of these two uses of the word "conduct.""3 Thus,
a restrictive definition of the word "conduct" affects the
government's ability to enforce the Act.'4
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 5 the Supreme Court considered
application of the "operation or management" test," whereby a
party is liable under § 1962(c) only if he or she has participated
in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.'7 By
construing the phrase "to conduct or participate, directly or
indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs" as import-
ing a degree of direction or control into § 1962(c), 8 the Su-
preme Court has created a defense to actions brought under the
Act that unduly restricts the scope of RICO and that will deter
bringing criminal prosecutions under the Act.
Imagine a federal prosecutor evaluating two cases for prose-
cution post-Reves. In the first case, a bank president lied to
regulators, bribed Congressmen, defrauded investors, and re-
ceived kickbacks on real estate loans. In the second case, a
soldier in an organized crime family committed murder, arson,
and engaged in numerous extortionate credit transactions.
Passed in 1970 as title IX of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,' RICO prohibits (1) the use of money gained from
12. Id.
13. The word conduct appears twice in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988), first as a verb,
then as a noun. § 1962(c) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or
collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
14. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 6, Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993) (No. 91-886) ("[The Court of
Appeals' holding that the defendant must have participated in operating or managing
the enterprise in order to be held liable under Section 1962(c) is unfounded and
threatens to impede the government's enforcement of the RICO statute.") Id.
15. 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
16. See Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983).
17. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1172-73.
18. Id. at 1169-70.
19. Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941
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a "pattern of racketeering activity" in acquiring or operating
any "enterprise" engaged in interstate commerce; ° (2) the ac-
quisition of such an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity;2 (3) the running of such an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity;22 and (4) the conspiracy to
commit any of these activities." Consequently, on its face, the
Act provides that almost any connection between a pattern of
racketeering activity and an enterprise engaged in interstate
commerce constitutes a RICO violation.
After ten years of relatively little use, RICO became an im-
portant and harsh tool in the hands of prosecutors during the
1980's and beyond. Hotly contested prosecutions produced
reams of pages of judicial interpretation. Given the power of
the Act, the Justice Department implemented strict guidelines
for centralized review and approval of the Act's use.' The civil
component of the Act, however, produced pleadings by the pri-
vate bar which had not undergone rigorous review like that
attendant to the government's use of the Act. The courts, in-
cluding the Supreme Court, repeatedly expressed concern over
the private misuse of the Act and the federalizing of routine
contract matters through overly creative pleadings." Scholars
debated both sides of the issue with the plaintiff and defense
(1970) (codified at 189 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)).
20. § 1962(a).
21. § 1962(b).
22. § 1962(c).
23. § 1962(d).
24. Unlike private RICO actions, all government actions are subject to strict in-
ternal review and controls. The Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice
established a system whereliy every proposed RICO action by the government, crimi-
nal or civil, is submitted to the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section for review
and approval. See CRIMINAL DIv., THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, ORGANIZED CRIME
AND RACKETEERING § 9-110.320 (Supp. II 1993) [hereinafter MANUAL]. The Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section modifies most of these cases before the charges are
filed. Id. § 9-110.210. As a result of the review process, very few of the Justice
Department's RICO prosecutions have failed because of defective pleadings or legal
justification. Arguably, the lack of such controls over private civil actions has caused
much of the controversy surrounding the private use of RICO. Obviously, this has a
negative impact upon governmental actions.
25. See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, Two Cheers for This Bill to Reform RICO, WALL
ST. J., June 27, 1990, at A13 (praising a 1990 House Bill that restricted use of RICO
in civil cases); Wounding the RICO Beast, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1989, at F2 (stating
that Judge Sentelle of the D.C. Circuit has labeled RICO "the monster that ate ju-
risprudence").
bars predictably on opposite sides of the call for civil RICO
reform.28
Whether § 1962(c) of the Act is used properly by the private
bar or not, the Supreme Court has repeatedly articulated its
suspicion that because abuses occur, the scope of the Act needs
redefinition.' Nevertheless, any proposed change in RICO
must be measured not only in terms of its perceived abuses,
but also in terms of the negative impact that it may have on
desirable law enforcement efforts. For this reason alone, any
restriction on the reach of RICO should come from Congress
rather than the Supreme Court. Notwithstanding this reasoning
and an intellectual tradition which abhors judicial activism, the
Burger and Rehnquist Supreme Courts acted based on their
perception and redefined RICO in ways that are inconsistent
with both its plain meaning and congressional intent. The re-
sult is that the ability of government prosecutors to use the Act
effectively has diminished due to limitations imposed through
private litigation. After Reves, the absurd result of the two
hypotheticals previously offered may well be that the bank
president is clearly within the scope of the Act while the mafia
foot soldier may not be.
This Article argues that the Supreme Court's decision in
Reves was incorrect on the merits and that the decision invites
legislative reversal. Part II traces the history of RICO and the
calls for civil RICO reform. Parts III, IV, and V trace the Su-
preme Court's expansive approach to RICO in its criminal and
criminal forfeiture analyses. In this regard, the Supreme
Court's liberal construction of the Act enabled the government
to secure numerous important convictions under RICO and
made RICO one of the most effective tools for prosecuting orga-
26. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 8, at 1; G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry,
An Analysis of the Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Pro-
posals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is this the End of RICO?,2 " 43 VAND. L. REv. 851
(1990); Susan Getzendanner, Judicial "Pruning" of "Garden Variety Fraud" Civil RICO
Cases Does Not Work: It's Time for Congress to Act, 43 VAND. L. REv. 673 (1990);
Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White Collar Crime: The Ironic Demise of
Civil RICO, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1993); William J. Hughes, RICO Reform: How
Much Is Needed? 43 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1990); Adam F. Ingber, 10b-5 or Not 10b-5?
Are the Current Efforts to Reform Securities Litigation Misguided?, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 351 (1993) (arguing that reform of RICO is preferable to reform of Rule lob-5).
27. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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nized crime, drug trafficking and official corruption. Part VI
discusses the Supreme Court's warning concerning RICO's
reach. Parts VII, VIII and IX argue that by importing an "oper-
ation or management" test into § 1962(c), the Supreme Court
further limited the reach of RICO and potentially, the gov-
ernment's ability to use the Act for its intended purpose.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF RICO
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act,
of which Title IX is known as RICO.28 Congress enacted the
1970 Act to "strengthen the legal tools in the evidence-gather-
ing process, by establishing new penal prohibitions and, by
providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies . ..." In
1980, the private bar finally began to bring civil RICO suits."
Since that time, the number of civil RICO suits brought by the
private bar has increased dramatically, 1 causing many to be-
lieve that RICO is overused and that civil RICO should be
reformed.
For example, a former federal judge has commented:
My RICO perspective comes fr-om my years as a federal
district court judge in Chicago from 1980 to 1987, when I
witnessed the real birth and growth of civil RICO. I am
told . . . that for a time I had written more RICO opinions
than any other judge in the country .... As I dealt with
these cases, it became clear to me that most civil RICO
cases simply should not be in federal court. The majority of
civil RICO cases involve commonplace commercial controver-
sies, the facts of which reveal an ordinary business relation-
ship gone sour. These mercantile meles are recharacterized
28. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-1968 (1988)).
29. § 901, 84 Stat. at 923.
30. See A.B.A. SEC. CORP., BANKING & Bus. LAW, Report of the Ad Hoc Civil
RICO Task Force 55 (1985).
31. For example, although RICO was enacted in 1970, the civil provisions were
not used extensively until the early 1980's. As reported by a RICO task force of the
American Bar Association, of approximately 270 trial court decisions between 1970
and 1985, only 3% were decided before 1980, 20% in 1980, 7% in 1981, 13% in 1982,
33% in 1983, and 43% in 1984. Id.
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by resourceful attorneys to conform with the requirements
of RICO: adding a few allegations of the use of the mails or
wires in furtherance of a fraudulent scheme, describing how
the mail or wire fraud offenses form a pattern, and explain-
ing how the defendants conducted the affairs of an appro-
priate enterprise. Thus transmogrified, the ordinary state
law fraud or contract action becomes a federal "racketeer-
ing" case, threatening treble damages, costs, and attorney's
fees. Not only is this transformation unfair to the typical
commercial defendant, but it also burdens the dockets of
the federal courts and multiplies the legal costs for both
sides in otherwise straightforward litigation.3 2
At the same time the private bar increased its use of RICO,
the Act became the prosecutor's tool of choice in organized
crime, political corruption, white collar crime, terrorism, and
hate group prosecutions.' Also, the Department of Justice be-
gan enforcing the civil provisions of the Act.34 Nevertheless,
the clogging of the judicial docket by the private bar's perceived
and often actual misuse of civil RICO has stimulated the Su-
preme Court's efforts to limit the reach of the Act. Thus, as in
the area of habeas corpus, the Court created a measure of
docket control for itself in the absence of congressional ac-
tion.35 In both areas, the Court appears to believe it is acting
merely to protect the caseload of the lower federal courts.
32. Getzendanner, supra note 26, at 674.
33. See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109-11 (1985) (statement of Assistant Attorney Gener-
al Stephen S. Trott) [hereinafter Oversight Hearings]; see also United States v.
Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522 (9th Cir.) (RICO prosecution of a white-hate group, for
robbery, murder and other crimes), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866 (1988); United States v.
Angiulo, 847 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1988) (RICO prosecution of a Boston organized crime
family); United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (RICO
prosecution of a Japanese corporation for mail fraud and bribery).
34. See Karen Tumulty, U.S. Files Suit to Oust Mob from N.Y. Waterfront, L.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 1990, at Al (reporting a civil RICO suit by the Justice Department
against the International Longshoremen's Association alleging extortion, embezzlement,
bribes, mail fraud, assault and murder; quoting the Attorney General's statement that
a "hidden tax of payments to organized crime" was imposed that cost the consumers
millions of dollars; and noting the opposition by more than 250 members of Congress
as well as former Gov. Michael S. Dukakis to the use of civil RICO against unions).
35. See, e.g., Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 362 (1991).
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III. EXPANDING RICO's REACH: CRIMINAL ENTERPRISES
Beginning with its decision in United States v. Turkette,'
the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1962(c) allowed the
government to expand use of the Act in a manner that was not
only appropriate, but served legitimate law enforcement purpos-
es. In Turkette, the Supreme Court endorsed "illegitimate enter-
prise" prosecution.37 The indictment in Turkette concerned a
number of arson-for-profit schemes."5 After conviction, and on
appeal, respondent argued that "RICO was intended solely to
protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by rack-
eteers and that RICO" did not prohibit "participation in an
association which performed only illegal acts and which" did not
"attempt to infiltrate a legitimate enterprise."3 The First Cir-
cuit agreed with the respondent's position, reversing his con-
viction. ° However, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the term "enterprise" encompassed both legitimate and illegiti-
mate enterprises.41 As the Supreme Court reasoned, "[t]he
common thread to all counts was [Turkette's] alleged leadership
of this criminal organization through which he orchestrated and
participated in the commission of the various crimes."42
Both the prosecution and the Supreme Court found
Turkette's and his co-conspirators' conduct a "criminal organiza-
tion":
[A] group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of
illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs,
committing arsons, utilizing the United States mail to de-
fraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe
local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempt-
ing to corruptly influence the outcome of state court pro-
ceedings . ... ""
36. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
37. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 580-81.
38. The Supreme Court opinion itself offers few of the facts of the case; however,
the opinion of the First Circuit discusses the evidence supporting the charges in some
detail. See United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 908-09 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452
U.S. 576 (1981).
39. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 579-80.
40. Id. at 580.
41. Id. at 593.
42. Id. at 579.
43. Id. (quoting the indictment),
676
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In response to the appellate court's contention that expanding
RICO to illegitimate enterprises would merge the enterprise
requirement into a pattern of racketeering requirement, 44 the
Court found that while the evidence used to prove the two
elements may overlap, both elements must be proved. Thus, the
Court stated that "[in order to secure a conviction under RICO,
the Government must prove both the existence of an 'enterprise'
and the connected 'pattern of racketeering activity.' 45 The
Court then stated that a RICO enterprise must be an "entity"
proven "by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or infor-
mal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a
continuing unit."46
The Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the word "enter-
prise" in Turkette allowed prosecutors to use the Act effectively
in carrying out the aims of Congress. As one commentator has
stated:
The advantages to the prosecution in indicting this sort
of case under RICO . .. are considerable. Crimes that oth-
erwise could not have been joined in the same indictment
could be amalgamated, crimes over which the federal gov-
ernment would ordinarily not have jurisdiction could be
proved, and defendants who were involved in only a small
part of the operation could be tied into the same indict-
ment. In addition, greatly enhanced penalties would be
available, without the need for procedurally cumbersome
mechanisms such as those of the Dangerous Special Offend-
er statute."7
Thus, the interpretation of § 1962(c) adopted in Turkette
turn[ed] RICO from a probably redundant prohibition of
acts of infiltration into precisely the sort of prohibition
against membership in a criminal organization that seemed
as problematic earlier. After Turkette, RICO makes it a
crime not only to infiltrate or corrupt legitimate enterprises,
44. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d 896, 899 (1st Cir. 1980), rev'd, 452 US.
576 (1981).
45. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
46. Id.
47. Lynch, supra note 7, at 706.
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but also to be a gangster, whether in the Mafia or in a
much more loosely affiliated criminal combine.48
IV. EXPANDING RICO's REACH: FORFEITURE
Arguably, the Supreme Court's decision in Russello v. United
States,49 represents the culmination of the Supreme Court's
acceptance of the government's efforts to use RICO as an effec-
tive weapon. The target was not only organized crime infiltra-
tion of legitimate business, but also the existing criminal orga-
nizations in general.
Russello, like Turkette, involved an arson-for-hire ring. The
arsonists were convicted of RICO violations, among other
crimes, and, in addition to fines and prison sentences, various
forfeitures were ordered. The issue before the Supreme Court
was whether the profits earned by one of the arsonists were
subject to forfeiture as part of the RICO judgment."
The forfeiture provision of RICO as it stood in 1983 provided
that any person convicted of violating RICO forfeited to the
United States "any interest he [had] acquired or maintained in
violation of' RICO.5 Russello argued in support of a narrow
construction of the forfeiture provision such that money or prof-
its acquired through criminal conduct could not constitute an
"interest" within the meaning of § 1963(a)(1) because an
"'[i]nterest,' by definition, includes of necessity an interest in
something."52 That is to say, an interest, as opposed to profits
or proceeds, should be defined as an interest in the enterprise
itself.
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected Russello's argu-
ments, stating as follows:
We note that the RICO statute's definition of the term
"enterprise" in § 1961(4) encompasses both legal entities
and illegitimate associations-in-fact. Forfeiture of an interest
48. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
49. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
50. Russello, 464 U.S. at 17.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) (1982).
52. Russello, 464 U.S. at 22 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 9) (emphasis added).
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in an illegitimate association-in-fact ordinarily would be of
little use because an association of that kind rarely has
identifiable assets; instead, proceeds or profits usually are
distributed immediately. Thus, construing § 1963(a)(1) to
reach only interests in an enterprise would blunt the effec-
tiveness of the provision in combatting illegitimate enter-
prises, and would mean that "[wihole areas of organized
criminal activity would be placed beyond" the reach of the
statute.3
Thus, the Supreme Court took an expansive view of the forfei-
ture provisions in Turkette.
As Professor Lynch has noted,' whether or not Russello was
consistent with the congressional intent behind the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, it is clearly consistent with the
spirit of the congressional intent behind the expanded reach of
RICO which occurred in the 1980's. For example, in the Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,"5 Congress expressly
adopted the Russello holding and elaborated on the forfeiture
provisions of the Act.56 Thus, one may argue that the 1984
forfeiture provisions enacted by Congress represent an implicit
endorsement not only of the expanded reach of RICO, but also
of its use of RICO against illegitimate associations. Russello
clearly suggests that Congress is satisfied with the Supreme
Court's expansive interpretation of RICO in the area of
crime.'
53. Id. at 24 (quoting United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 589 (1981)).
54. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 710-13.
55. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (codified in various sections of the
U.S.C.).
56. § 302, 98 Stat. at 2040 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963).
57. Cf. United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1241-44 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing
the Seventh Circuit's analysis of pre- and post-amendment forfeiture).
1994] RICO 679
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V. EXPANDING RICO's REACH: STANDING AND THE "PATTERN"
CONCEPT
In Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co.,58 Sedima, a Belgian cor-
poration, filed an action in a New York federal district court.
Sedima's complaint set forth claims under § 1964(c) of RICO,59
supported by alleged violations of § 1962(c) based on predicate
acts of mail and wire fraud.6" A third count alleged a conspir-
acy to violate § 1962(c). 1
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York held that "for an injury to be 'by reason of a viola-
tion of § 1962,' " as required by § 1964(c), it must somehow be
different in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predi-
cate acts of racketeering activity.2 In an attempt to limit
RICO's scope, the district court held that a complaint must
allege a "RICO-type injury," which was either a "racketeering
enterprise injury," or a "competitive injury." In Sedima, the dis-
trict court found "no allegation ... of any injury apart from
that which would result directly from the alleged predicate acts
of mail fraud and wire fraud," and accordingly, dismissed the
RICO counts for failure to state a claim. 3
The Second Circuit affirmed,64 holding that Sedima's com-
plaint was defective in two ways. First, the Second Circuit
found that Sedima's complaint failed to allege an injury "by
reason of a violation of § 1962."' In the Second Circuit's view,
the language of the sections was clearly a limitation on stand-
ing, reflecting congressional intent to compensate victims of
"certain specific kinds of organized criminality, [and] not simply
to provide additional remedies for already compensable inju-
ries."6 Analogizing to the Clayton Act, which was the model
for § 1964(c), the Second Circuit concluded that just as an anti-
58. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
59. Id. at 483-85.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 484.
62. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 574 F. Supp. 963, 965 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)
(citation omitted), affd, 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
63. Id.
64. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984) rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
65. Id. at 494.
66. Id. (emphasis added).
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trust plaintiff must allege an "antitrust injury," a RICO
plaintiff must allege a "racketeering injury"-an injury "differ-
ent in kind from that occurring as a result of the predicate acts
themselves, or not simply caused by the predicate acts, but also
caused by an activity which RICO was designed to deter."87 In
addition, the Second Circuit found the complaint defective for
failure to allege that the defendants had already been criminal-
ly convicted of the predicated acts of mail and wire fraud or of
a RICO violation.'
In reversing the Second Circuit's opinion, the United States
Supreme Court poignantly stated:
In response to what it perceived to be misuse of civil RICO
by private plaintiffs, the court below construed § 1964(c) to
permit private actions only against defendants who had
been convicted on criminal charges, and only where there
had occurred a "racketeering injury." While we understand
the court's concern over the consequences of an unbridled
reading of the statute, we reject both of its holdings.69
After a lengthy review of the legislative history of the private
action for treble damages, the Supreme Court held that there
was no support in
the statute's history, its language or considerations of policy
for a requirement that a private treble-damages action
under § 1964(c) can proceed only against a defendant who
has already been criminally convicted. To the contrary,
every indication is that no such requirement exists. Accord-
ingly, the fact that Imrex and the individual defendants
have not been convicted under RICO or the federal mail
and wire fraud statutes does not bar Sedima's action.70
Moreover, in considering the Second Circuit's prerequisite for
a private civil RICO action "injury... caused by an activity
which RICO was designed to deter"7 -the Supreme Court
adopted a less restrictive construction of the Act, holding that
67. Id. at 496 (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 481 (1985).
70. Id. at 493.
71. 741 F.2d 482, 496 (2d Cir. 1984) rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
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[wihere the plaintiff alleges each element of the violation,
the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by
predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern for
the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts
in connection with the conduct of an enterprise. Those acts
are, when committed in the circumstances delineated in
§ 1962(c), "an activity which RICO was designed to deter."
Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation
of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predicate
acts.72
Finally, with respect to judicial attempts to limit RICO's
reach, the Court stated the following:
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version,
RICO is evolving into something quite different from the
original conception of its enactors. Though sharing the
doubts of the Court of Appeals about this increasing diver-
gence, we cannot agree with either its diagnosis or its rem-
edy. The "extraordinary" uses to which civil RICO has been
put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the
predicate offenses, in particular the inclusion of wire, mail
and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress and the
courts to develop a meaningful concept of "pattern." We do
not believe that the amorphous standing requirement im-
posed by the Second Circuit effectively responds to these
problems, or that it is a form of statutory amendment ap-
propriately undertaken by the courts.73
This judicial philosophy represents the Supreme Court's analy-
sis of RICO's scope in the mid-1980's.74
72. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 500 (citations omitted).
74. See also American Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 608-
09 (1985) (rejecting the Seventh Circuit's formulation of a requirement of a distinct
RICO injury and holding that a civil claim for treble damages under RICO does not
require that the plaintiff have suffered damages by reason of defendant's violation
through proscribed predicate offenses; rather, injury from those offenses alone is suffi-
cient).
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VI. LIMITING RICO's REACH: RELUCTANTLY ABANDONING THE
"MULTIPLE SCHEMES" TEST WITH A WARNING
Six years after its decision in Sedima, the Supreme Court, in
H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,75 rejected the
judicial philosophy it espoused in Sedima, and, like the lower
federal courts that it had once admonished, began to limit the
reach of RICO as a remedy in response to its perception that
RICO had evolved into something beyond the scope of Congress'
original intent. Considering the meaning of the phrase "pattern
of racketeering" in H.J., Inc., the Supreme Court faced the
results of litigation over its earlier dicta in Sedima. In Sedima,
the Court had stated that by requiring "at least two acts of
racketeering," Congress had implied "that while two acts are
necessary, they may not be sufficient."76 As a result of this
interpretation, the circuits split in their analyses of RICO cases
predicated on mail fraud schemes.7 The Eighth Circuit devel-
oped a "multiple schemes" test for resolving the dilemma where
a pattern could not be established by multiple mailings in fur-
therance of a single mail fraud scheme.78 While noting that
the presence of multiple schemes were significant in establish-
ing a requisite pattern, the Court nonetheless rejected the
Eighth Circuit's mechanical test." However, this apparent vic-
tory for pro-RICO advocates was illusory.
In H.J. Inc., the petitioners filed a class action suit alleging
violations of § 1962(a), (b), (c) and (d), seeking an injunction
and treble damages under RICO's civil liability provisions,
§ 1964(a) and (c). The district court dismissed the complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted because each of the fraudulent acts alleged was "com-
mitted in furtherance of a single scheme" rather than multiple
illegal schemes."0 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
75. 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
76. Sedima, S.P.L.R. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 & n.14 (1985).
77. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 235 & n.2.
78. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell & Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
79. 492 U.S. at 240-41.
80. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 425 (D. Minn.
1986), affd, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
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court's decision, holding that under precedent, a single scheme
is insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 1
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit's decision.82
Rather than give the Act its broadest possible reach as Con-
gress explicitly required, the Court formulated its own "continu-
ity and relationship" test for establishing patterns by giving
great weight to isolated remarks within the legislative histo-
ry. Though read as narrowing the scope of the Act, the test
actually had little effect on prosecutions under § 1962(c). "Rela-
tionship" is almost inherent in RICO cases where the predicate
acts are carried out as part of the enterprise's activities or in
infiltrating the same. The "continuity" element is met either by
the facts or through the use of § 1962(d) to allege that continu-
ity is missing only because the plan was aborted, presumably
due to outside factors such as law enforcement intervention or
private sleuthing. Thus, the test itself did little to limit the
Act's use.
Specifically, in H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court defined relation-
ship in terms of predicate acts "hav[ing] the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-
sion, or otherwise [being] interrelated by distinguishing charac-
teristics and ... not isolated events."' In applying the rela-
tionship prong of the pattern requirement, the circuit courts
have consistently followed the language of H.J. Inc.85 In the
aftermath of H.J. Inc., the lower federal courts require prosecu-
tors to prove that predicate acts are related and that the acts
pose a threat of continued criminal activity.8"
Continuity has been interpreted by the circuit courts to be a
81. H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650.
82. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 250.
83. Id. at 238-39.
84. Id. at 240.
85. See, e.g., Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 945 F.2d 594, 609 (3d Cir.
1991) (following H.J. Inc. in defining "relationship" for proof of pattern of racketeering
activity); Terry A. Lambert Plumbing v. Western Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 979-80
(8th Cir. 1991) (quoting language of H.J. Inc. in defining "relationship").
86. See, e.g., United States v. Dischner, 974 F.2d 1502, 1509 (9th Cir. 1992) (stat-
ing that a relationship plus continuity "formula" has been adopted to prove pattern of
racketeering activity); United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 207 (3d Cir. 1992) (fol-
lowing H.J. Inc., and stating that relationship and continuity are required to prove a
pattern of racketeering activity).
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temporal concept, referring either to a closed-ended period of
continuous commission of predicate acts or to an open-ended
period that, by its nature, will project into the future.s7 The
circuit courts have not determined a specific length of time that
is sufficient to fulfill the continuity requirement of closed-ended
racketeering activity. For example, the First Circuit has held
that commission of predicate acts over a period of six years is
sufficient to establish continuity." The Third Circuit, however,
has found that predicate acts done within a limited time period
of seven months is not sufficient for continuity.89
The true significance of H.J. Inc. can be found not in the
holding but in the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia, wherein
he was joined by the Chief Justice, Justice O'Connor and Jus-
tice Kennedy. The concurring opinion criticized the continuity
plus relationship test as being "about as helpful [to the lower
courts in interpreting the Act] as 'life is a fountain."'90 Justice
Scalia then wrote "[it is, however, unfair to be so critical of the
Court's effort, because I would be unable to provide an inter-
pretation of RICO that gives significantly more guidance con-
cerning its application."9'
87. See, e.g., Pelullo, 964 F.2d at 208 (holding that continuity is determined on a
case-by-case basis considering whether the activity was closed- or open-ended); United
States v. Stodola, 953 F.2d 266, 270 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that continuity is a tem-
poral concept).
88. United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 504-05 (lst Cir. 1990) (finding that con-
tinuity was proven by predicate acts of narcotics trafficking over a period of six
years).
89. Marshall-Silver Coast. Co. v. Mendel, 894 F.2d 593, 597 (3d Cir. 1990) (find-
ing that an attempt, over a period of seven months, to ruin plaintiffs reputation by
forcing him into bankruptcy did not satisfy continuity requirement). The Sixth Circuit
has held that a prosecutor- may also establish continuity by proving the threat of
continued criminal activity in the future. United States v. Busacca, 936 F.2d 232,
237-38 (6th Cir. 1991). This threat may be established "by showing that the related
predicates themselves involve a distinct threat of long term racketeering activity,
either implicit or explicit, or by showing that the predicate acts or offenses are a
part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business." Id. at 238. See also Unit-
ed States v. O'Connor, 910 F.2d 1466 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding police officer's accep-
tance of a number of bribes over a period of two months sufficient to fulfill the
closed-ended continuity requirement). The racketeering activity does not necessarily
have to be of a long duration if the threat of continued racketeering activity is pro-
jected into the future.
90. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 254-55 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia then sent a warning on behalf of four members
of the Court. Relying on Justice Marshall's dissent in Sedima,
Justice Scalia invited a constitutional challenge of RICO by
suggesting that the pattern requirement may be impermissibly
vague. Justice Scalia's frustration is evident from his statement,
"[t]hat the highest Court in the land has been unable to derive
from this statute anything more than today's meager guidance
bodes ill for the day when that challenge is presented."92 This
message sent shockwaves through the RICO plaintiffs bar. It
was particularly unexpected given the Court's decision in Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana," where the Court rejected a
constitutional vagueness challenge to the Indiana RICO statute
which had been patterned on the federal law."
How could a statute once viewed as broad but clear suddenly
be in danger of being held unconstitutionally vague? Though of
the litigation will continue on the "vagueness issue" as a result
of H.J. Inc., the lower courts thus far have rejected such chal-
lenges." The Supreme Court, however, had set the stage for
giving legal significance to its displeasure with RICO.
VII. REVES V. ERNST & YOUNG: THE CHILLING EFFECT ON
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
A. Facts of the Case
The civil law suit in Reves v. Ernst & Young" was brought
by the trustee in bankruptcy of the Farmer's Cooperative of
Arkansas and Oklahoma, Inc. (the "Co-op") and certain
noteholders against forty individuals and entities, including
Arthur Young and Company,97 the Co-op's accountant. The
92. Id. at 255-56 (Scalia, J., concurring).
93. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
94. Id. at 57-58.
95. See, United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 487 (7th Cir. 1992).
96. 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993). Like the court at summary judgment, we do not con-
sider likely the factual defenses presented by Arthur Young.
97. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1168. The Co-op hired Russell Brown and Company to
perform its financial audit in 1981. On January 2, 1992, Russell Brown and Company
merged with Arthur Young and Company. Arthur Young and Company later became
respondent Ernst & Young. Id. at 1167. For clarity, we hereinafter refer to the re-
spondent as "Arthur Young".
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trustee's suit alleged, among other things, that Arthur Young's
financial statements for the Co-op were fraudulent in violation
of § 1962(c).98
As the Co-op's auditor, one of Arthur Young's first duties was
to determine the fixed asset value of White Flame Fuels, Inc.
("White Flame" or "the Company"), a company allegedly pur-
chased by the Co-op in February of 1980."9 Although the Co-
op's 1980 financial statement gave no fixed asset value for
White Flame,' Arthur Young "'essentially invented"' 0 ' a
figure identical to the fraudulent figure that the Company's
prior, and now convicted, accountant had previously created.
Second, Arthur Young had to determine how the Company's
value should be treated for accounting purposes.' 2 If the Co-
op had owned the company from its formation in 1979, the
Company's value for accounting purposes would have been its
fixed-asset value of $4.5 million.' ° If the Co-op had purchased
the Company in February of 1980, it would have to be given its
fair market value at the time of purchase: somewhere between
$444,000 and $1.5 million."°4 If the Company was valued at
less than $1.5 million, the Co-op was insolvent.'
Although the Co-op's 1980 financial statement and a local
court consent decree indicated that the Co-op did not acquire
White Flame until February of 1980, Arthur Young, on its own
volition, made representations that the Co-op had acquired
White Flame in May of 1979. Thus, for accounting purposes,
Arthur Young represented that the Company's fixed asset value
was $4.5 million.' 6
Basing the audit on these facts, not only did Arthur Young
present its 1981 audit report to the Co-op's board, but it failed
to tell the board of its conclusion that the Co-op had owned
White Flame since its creation in 1979 and that, without that
98. Id. at 1168.
99. Id. at 1167.
100. Id. at 1176 (Souter, J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1167.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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conclusion, the Co-op was insolvent.'°7 At the 1982 annual
meeting of the Co-op, Arthur Young distributed condensed fi-
nancial statements to the members."8 These condensed finan-
cial statements included White Flame's contrived $4.5 million
asset value among its total assets. Once again, Arthur Young
omitted relevant information as to the Co-op's real financial
status.0 9 Finally, in the 1982 audit report presented to the
board, Arthur Young reported the value of White Flame as
being approximately $4.5 million and made representations that
it was responsible for the Co-op showing a positive net
worth."10 A condensed financial statement was distributed by
Arthur Young at the Co-op's annual meeting in 1983. At the
1983 annual meeting, Arthur Young once again failed to state
that the Co-op was in grave financial danger if White Flame
were written down to its fair market value."'
On February 23, 1984, the Co-op filed for bankruptcy.12 On
February 14, 1985, the trustee in bankruptcy filed suit."'
B. The District Court Decision
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Arthur Young on the RICO claim. Applying the "operation or
management" test established in Bennett v. Berg,"' the dis-
trict court ruled that,
Plaintiffs have failed to show anything more than that the
accountants reviewed a series of completed transactions and
certified the Co-op's records as fairly portraying its financial
status as of a date three or four months preceding the
meetings of the directors and the shareholders at which
they presented their reports. We do not hesitate to declare
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1167-68.
110. Id. at 1168.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983) (requiring "some participation in the operation or management of the enter-
prise itself').
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that such activities fail to satisfy the degree of management
required by Bennett v. Berg."'
Therefore, the district court found that because the conduct
engaged in by Arthur Young did not meet the "operation or
management" test of the Eighth Circuit, Arthur Young did not
"conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of'
the Co-op's affairs pursuant to § 1962(c).
C. The Circuit Court Decision
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to grant summary judg-
ment in favor of Arthur Young on the RICO claim."' Ironical-
ly, the court of appeals characterized Arthur Young's conduct
merely as being "limited to the audits, meetings with the Board
of Directors to explain the audits, and presentations at the
annual meeting.""7 Thereafter, the court of appeals stated
that "[i]n the course of this involvement it is clear that Arthur
Young committed a number of reprehensible acts . . . ."'
Nevertheless, like the district court, the Eight Circuit applied
its "operation or management" test as articulated in Bennett v.
Berg and held that Arthur Young's conduct "in no way...
[rose] to the level of participation in the management or oper-
ation of the Co-op""' required for a RICO violation. 2 °
115. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1168, (1993) (citing Robertson v.
White, 113 F.R.D. 20 (W.D. Ark. 1986)).
116. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1339-40 (8th Cir. 1991), affd
sub nom., Reves v. Ernest & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
117. Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added). It is not clear, however, that the Eighth Circuit agreed
with the test as articulated in Bennett. For example, in response to the plaintiffs'
contention that the court of appeals should follow the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th
Cir. 1986), not imposing a requirement that a RICO defendant participate in the
management or operation of the enterprise, the Eighth Circuit stated, "[w]e are aware
of the inconsistencies between the circuits regarding the necessary level of participa-
tion for RICO liability .... But until the Supreme Court rejects our standard or
this court en banc overrules Bennett, we are bound to follow that decision." Arthur
Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324.
120. Arthur Young & Co., 937 F.2d at 1324.
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D. The Supreme Court Wrongly Decided Reves v. Ernst &
Young
The Supreme Court's conclusion in Reves that in order "to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
an enterprise's affairs under § 1962(c), one must participate in
the operation or management of the enterprise itself is flawed
in several respects. First, the Supreme Court's construction and
use of the term "conduct" in § 1962(c) fails to recognize that the
term is used twice, first as a verb and then as a noun. In
terms of context, by failing to recognize these two uses of the
term as they appear in the Act, the Court creates a nonexistent
congressional limitation of liability under § 1962(c) for those
who participate in the operation or management of an enter-
prise itself. Thus, the Supreme Court, rather than Congress,
has in effect, amended § 1962(c) by importing an "operation or
management test" into the statute. Second, even assuming
arguendo that an "operation or management" test is appropri-
ate, the Court clearly misapplies the test to the facts presented
in this case. As a result, the floodgates of the federal courts are
now open for use of this test as a defense in not only civil
RICO litigation, but also criminal prosecutions brought under
§ 1962(c).
1. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Reves
The Supreme Court's analysis of Arthur Young's liability
ignores alternative plain meanings of the words "conduct" and
"participate" which mandated the opposite result of Reves' actu-
al outcome. The majority concluded that the term "conduct,"
when used as a noun, signifies a high degree of direction or
control in § 1962(c) sufficient for Arthur Young's allegedly
fraudulent conduct to escape liability under the Act. In reaching
this conclusion, the Supreme Court ignored the two uses of the
term "conduct" in § 1962(c), that when read together, clearly
import no degree of direction or control under the Act. Further-
more, the Court failed to consider the numerous acts of Arthur
Young, which on their face, could arguably fall within the pur-
690 [Vol. 28:669
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view of the "operation or management" test to which the Court
has given birth.'"
In Reves, the only portion of the appellate court's decision at
issue was its affirmation of summary judgment granted to Ar-
thur Young on the RICO claim. The Supreme Court took issue
with the district court and the Eighth Circuit's application of
the "operation or management" test articulated in Bennett v.
Berg.2 The Court also attempted to resolve the conflict be-
tween the D.C. Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit in Yellow Bus
Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union
63 9 ' and Bank of America National Trust v. Touche Ross &
Co.' 4 The issue as the Court stated, was "the meaning of the
121. The Court's application of its "operation or management" test to the alleged
conduct engaged in by Arthur Young in Reves clearly recognized the negative impact
that the undisciplined use of civil RICO against accounting firms can have on the
relationship between an accounting firm and its clients. More likely than not, absent
the knowing involvement of upper management, accounting firms such as Arthur
Young should be shielded from the use of RICO for the very conduct at issue in
Reves. However, that issue is not one which should have been resolved by the Su-
preme Court. Rather, it is a decision which should be made by the legislature. For
this reason, the Supreme Court's conclusion regarding Arthur Young's conduct in
Reves may have brought about the right result for the wrong reason, albeit a reason
with unforeseen consequences to RICO's use in the future.
122. 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1983).
123. 913 F.2d 948, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839
(1991). The D.C. Circuit construed the "operation or management" test as follows:
Conduct is synonymous with "management" or "direction." The "conduct of
[the enterprise's] affairs" thus connotes more than just some relationship
to the enterprise's activity, the phrase refers to the guidance, manage-
ment, direction or other exercise of control over the course of the
enterprise's activities. In order to participate in the conduct of an
enterprise's affairs, then, a person must participate, to some extent, in
"running the show." . . . Section 1962(c) applies when a defendant,
through a pattern of racketeering activity, exercises significant control
over or within an enterprise, participating not merely in the enterprise's
affairs, but in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Most often the par-
ticipation requirement will be satisfied when a defendant either partici-
pates in directing the enterprise toward its preexisting goals or partici-
pates in exercising control over an enterprise so as to reset its goals.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
124. 782 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Circuit construed the "oper-
ation or management" test as follows:
RICO does not require [a large] degree of participation [as] urged by the
defendants. It is not necessary that a RICO defendant participate in the
management or operation of the enterprise. On its face, the statute re-
quires only that the defendant "participate, directly or indirectly in the
conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs" . . . The word "conduct" in § 1962(c)
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phrase 'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the
conduct of such enterprise's affairs.' 125 Obviously, the word
"conduct" is used twice. However, the Court found that in using
the word "conduct" first as a verb and second as a noun, it
seemed more "reasonable to give each use a similar construc-
tion."126 The Court found that as a verb, "conduct" means to
"lead, run, manage, or direct."'27 Rejecting petitioner's request
that the Court read "conduct" as "carry on," the Court found
that "context is important, and the context of the phrase 'to
conduct ... [an] enterprise's affairs,' . . . indicates some degree
of direction."'28
The Court stated that "[tihe more difficult question is what
to make of the word 'participate.' "'29 The Court found that in
the context of § 1962(c), "participate" "appears to have a nar-
rower meaning."' Thus the Court defined "participate" by
stating:
We may mark the limits of what the term might mean by
looking again at what Congress did not say. On the one
hand, "to participate ... in the conduct of... affairs" must
be broader than "to conduct affairs" or the "participate"
phrase would be superfluous. On the other hand, as we
have already noted, "to participate ... in the conduct
of... affairs" must be narrower than "to participate in
affairs" or Congress' repetition of the word "conduct" would
serve no purpose. It seems that Congress chose a middle
ground, consistent with a common understanding of the
word "participate"-"to take part in.""3'
The Court ultimately found the "operation or management"
test in § 1962(c) to mean that in order to participate, directly
or indirectly, in the conduct of prohibited enterprises affairs,
simply means the performance of activities necessary or helpful to the
operation of the enterprise.
Id. at 970. (citations omitted).
125. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993).
126. Id. (citing Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)).
127. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY, 474 (3d ed. 1976)).
128. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1169.
129. Id. at 1170.
130. Id. (citations omitted).
131. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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one must have some part in directing those affairs." 2 Because
the Court could not conclude that Arthur Young "participated"
in the operation or management of the Co-op itself, the account-
ing firm was not liable under § 1962(c).3 '
2. The Souter Dissent
Interestingly, while the majority of the Court found a "clear"
congressional mandate in the word "conduct" to limit § 1962(c)
liability to participants in the operation or management of a
RICO enterprise, Justice Souter, with whom Justice White
joined in dissent, found the exact opposite.3 Souter found the
statute's liberal construction clause "not irrelevant, but disposi-
rive." 135 Furthermore, even if he were to assume that the
word "conduct" imports a degree of direction or control into
§ 1962(c), "[Justice Souter] would have to say that the majority
misapplies its own 'operation or management' test to the facts
presented here."3 6
Justice Souter correctly pointed out that the term "conduct"
does not necessarily imply control because:
[tihe term, when used as noun, is defined by. the majority's
chosen dictionary as, for example, "carrying forward" or
"carrying out" . . . [Section] 1962(c) covers not just those
"employed by" an enterprise, but those merely "associated
with" it, as well ... [Associates (like employees) are pro-
hibited not merely from conducting the affairs of an enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering, not merely for
participating directly in such unlawful conduct, but even
from indirect participation in the conduct of an enterprise's
affairs in such a manner. The very breadth of this prohibi-
tion renders the majority's reading of "conduct" rather awk-
ward, for it is hard to imagine how the "operation or man-
agement" test would leave the statute with the capacity to
reach the indirect participation of someone merely associat-
ed with an enterprise .... [T]his contextual examination
132. Id. at 1169-74.
133. See id. at 1174.
134. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) ("The provisions of this
title shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.").
135. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1174 (Souter, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
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shows "conduct" to have a long arm, unlimited by any re-
quirement to prove that the activity includes an element of
direction. But at the very least, the full context is enough
to defeat the majority's conviction that the more restrictive
interpretation of the word "conduct" is clearly the one in-
tended.'37
Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that the majority's
reading of § 1962(c)'s operation or management test is correct,
Justice Souter correctly points out that even under the
majority's view, Arthur Young violated the statute.'38 Several
facts support this point:
1. Arthur Young did not confine itself in this case to the role
traditionally performed by an outside auditor;
2. Arthur Young created the very financial statements it was
hired to audit; and
3. Arthur Young took on management responsibilities by
deciding, in the first instance, what value to assign to the Co-
op's most important fixed asset, White Flame.
Under the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants'
Code of Professional Conduct, Arthur Young arguably aban-
doned the normal activities of an auditor and took on responsi-
bility in managing the Co-op's affairs by engaging in this con-
duct. Thus, even under the majority's "operation or manage-
ment test," Arthur Young crossed the line separating outside
137. Id. at 1174-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
138. Id. at 1175-77 (Souter, J., dissenting). The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants' ("AICPA7), Code of Professional Conduct indicates that manage-
ment has responsibility for the content of financial statements. The auditor "simply
expresses an opinion on the client's financial statements." Id. at 1175-76 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Brief for Respondent at 30). The auditors' code provides as follows:
The financial statements are managements responsibility. The auditor's
responsibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements. Man-
agement is responsible for adopting sound accounting policies and for
establishing and maintaining an internal control structure that will,
among other things, record, process, summarize, and report financial data
that is consistent with management's assertions embodied in the financial
statements .... The independent auditor may make suggestions about
the form or content of the financial statements or draft them, in whole
or in part, based on information from management's accounting system.
Codification of Accounting Standards and Procedures, Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards No. 1, § 110.02 AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PuB. AccouNTANTs (1972).
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auditors from inside financial managers and should have been
held answerable under § 1962(c). 39
VIII. USE OF RICO BY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE
EFFECT OF REVES ON CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
RICO is the most effective tool a prosecutor has in unravel-
ing organized crime in the United States today.'4 ° The Justice
Department effectively uses RICO to prosecute a broad range of
crimes such as government corruption, white collar crime, labor
corruption, and concerted criminal activity like narcotics traf-
ficking and arson.' RICO provides incentives to agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct investigations into
organized crime by assuring agents that a successful investiga-
tion will probably lead to a RICO prosecution that may effec-
tively remove an entire crime family from operating in a
city. For example, a successful RICO prosecution led to the
demise of the Nicodemo Scarfo family in Philadelphia.
RICO has also been extremely effective in attacking govern-
ment corruption. For example, the United States Attorney's
Office for the Northern District of Illinois used RICO in "Opera-
tion Greylord" to successfully prosecute corrupt judges, attor-
neys, court clerks and police officers that were involved in
schemes to fix cases in the Cook County state court system.'
White collar crime is effectively prosecuted using RICO in insid-
139. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1178.
140. Paul E. Coffey, The Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prose-
cutions, 65 NOTRE DAAE L. REV. 1035, 1038 (1990) (describing method used in decid-
ing to bring a RICO case by the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice).
141. Lynch, supra note 7, at 735.
142. Coffey, supra note 140, at 1038.
143. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (affirming
criminal RICO convictions of fourteen defendants, all members of the Scarfo crime
family).
144. See, e.g., United States v. LeFevour, 798 F.2d 977 (7th Cir. 1986) (convicting
judge under RICO for taking bribes to fix traffic infractions and allowing attorneys to
gain clients by soliciting potential defendants on the courthouse steps); United States
v. Con, 769 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding a court clerk was guilty under RICO
for soliciting and taking bribes to influence public officials); United States v. Murphy,
768 F.2d 1518 (7th Cir. 1985) (convicting judge for taking bribes in connection with
cases involving drunk driving, battery and felony theft).
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er trading cases and criminal fraud, such as mail, wire and
securities fraud.'45 For example, Alfred Elliott, an attorney,
was convicted under § 1962(c) of securities and mail fraud in
United States v. Elliott.46
Since RICO has become law, § 1962(c) has been, and re-
mains, the most effective subsection the Justice Department
has used in successfully prosecuting criminal RICO allega-
tions.47 According to officials at the Justice Department, of
the 914 cases brought by the Department since 1984, 898, or
ninety-eight percent of the indictments included § 1962(c) viola-
tions." Forty-three percent of these RICO cases solely in-
volved violations of § 1962(c). " 9 Section 1962(d) prohibits a
defendant from conspiring to commit any of the acts described
in subsections (a),(b) or (c). The Justice Department has coupled
subsection (d) with subsection (c) in 463 or fifty-one percent of
all the RICO indictments since 1984.150 The prosecutor nor-
mally alleges that the defendants conspired to violate subsec-
tion (c). The Justice Department has only coupled subsection (d)
with either subsection (a) or (b) in nine cases since 1984.''
Prosecutors have simply found that bringing a RICO indict-
ment under § 1962(c) is easier and more effective as compared
to subsections (a) and (b). Subsection (a) is not often used be-
cause a prosecutor must prove that a defendant actually invest-
ed or used racketeering proceeds in an enterprise.5 2 As decid-
ed in American National Bank & Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc.
153
and Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers
Local Union 639' a defendant cannot be charged both as the
enterprise and as the person conducting the racketeering activi-
145. Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of Justice,
43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 653 (1990).
146. 727 F. Supp. 1131 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
147. Lynch, supra note 7, at 731.
148. Interview with the Office of Public Affairs, The United States Department of
Justice, in Washington, D.C. (July 9, 1993).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1990)
(holding that receipt of income from a pattern of racketeering activity and investment
of this income in an enterprise must be proven under § 1962(a)).
153. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
154. 913 F.2d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2839 (1991).
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ty. In Yellow Bus Lines, the District of Columbia Circuit
stressed that the purpose of RICO is to prevent organized crime
and other racketeering activity from infiltrating the legitimate
business community. 5 Also, because subsection (a) is convo-
luted, instructing a jury on the elements of the subsection is
difficult.
Subsection (b) is not often used because it is fact-specific. The
prosecutor must prove ownership of the enterprise, an irrele-
vant element when prosecuting many RICO cases. In govern-
ment corruption cases the enterprise is the government and a
government official cannot own the government itself. Moreover,
in circumstances in which a prosecutor proves that an enter-
prise is an association-in-fact, it is often difficult to prove actual
ownership of that enterprise.
Under subsection (c), the prosecutor does not have to prove
an investment or use of racketeering proceeds or actual owner-
ship of an enterprise. The prosecutor must only prove that a
person has conducted or participated, "directly or indirectly," in
the racketeering affairs of an enterprise. This easier burden is
the reason that subsection (c) has been the most effective sub-
section of § 1962 since its enactment in 1970. Since Turkette
allows an enterprise to be considered an association-in-fact, the
Justice Department has been able to bring additional cases
under subsection (c).
Decisions in civil RICO affect governmental use of the stat-
ute.55 Although the Reves case was a private civil RICO ac-
tion, it will still affect the Justice Department's ability to bring
criminal indictments because the RICO statute is an integrated
whole."'
155. Id. at 954 (stating that entire RICO statute is limited to prevention of cor-
rupt acquisition of legitimate business).
156. Dennis, supra note 145, at 655. In deciding the civil RICO case, H.J. Inc. v.
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 299 (1989),
the Eighth Circuit held that a "pattern of racketeering activity" could only be proven
by establishing the existence of multiple schemes. Although the standard was eventu-
ally reversed by the Supreme Court, the Justice Department virtually stopped its use
of criminal RICO in the Eighth Circuit.
157. Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 790 (1988).
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IX. THE AFTERMATH OF REVEs
Congress could easily look at the effect of Reves and H.J. Inc.
and recognize that its intent is in danger of being frustrated. A
corrective response is unlikely, however. For years, the Justice
Department has unsuccessfully sought enhancement of the
Hobbs Act,'58 and forfeiture authority in mail fraud cases. In
fact, the most recent legislative fix undertaken on behalf of
prosecutors was the 1988 passage of 18 U.S.C. § 1346 as a
response to the Supreme Court's limitation of mail fraud prose-
cutions in McNally v. United States.59
Though the circuits continue to affirm RICO convictions not-
withstanding the dicta in H.J. Inc.' the practical effects of
Reves have yet to be felt. Once again, imagine the prosecutor
considering whether to bring charges against the bank presi-
dent and the mafia foot soldier. The bank president's case is a
fairly easy one to decide whether to prosecute. Congress has
added § 1344 as a RICO predicate offense so that bank crimes
are plainly within the intended reach of the Act. Selecting an
appropriate enterprise to charge is however, made more difficult
by Reves. The regulatory agency which is victimized by the
misrepresentations is not an appropriate enterprise to charge
because the bank president can hardly be said to exercise man-
agement or control of the regulatory agency. Similarly, the bank
president does not control Congress.' 6 ' Yet, the president of a
bank plainly manages and controls that institution so the bank
may be charged as the enterprise. Thus, Reves is ultimately no
impediment to this prosecution.
The mafia foot soldier, however, is more difficult to prosecute.
Turkette taught us that RICO's scope includes illegitimate en-
terprises, encompassing as broad an array of racketeering activ-
ity as possible. The soldier's efforts to infiltrate a legitimate
business will not be sufficient to give him control or manage-
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988).
159. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
160. See United States v. Ashman, 979 F.2d 469, 487 (7th Cir. 1992).
161. Indeed, one almost wonders whether Congress anticipated Reves with approv-
al, as one could argue that no one manages or controls Congress. Thus, Congress,
unlike several local and state legislative bodies, would never serve as a RICO "enter-
prise."
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ment of the business until he is successful. It is unlikely that
Congress intended for this type of criminal activity to succeed
before it became actionable under RICO, but that may be the
result of Reves.
The soldier in an organized crime family does not control or
manage the affairs of the godfather's enterprise - the godfa-
ther does. The soldier follows orders. If the United States
charged the "family" as the enterprise, the soldier would have a
defense based on his absence of control under Reves. Charging
the soldier as part of an "association-in-fact" enterprise will
doubtless be the prosecutors' solution to this dilemma. Yet, it is
an imperfect solution. Under American National Bank & Trust
Co. v. Haroco, Inc.,162 the association-in-fact cannot be both
defendant and enterprise (defendants merely conducting their
own affairs). Consequently, the association-in-fact will need to
become more than the sum of its parts to meet the required
"entity" status. Moreover, it is curious that prosecutors will be
forced to redefine their enterprises to satisfy Reves, where, as
in the hypothetical case, the more obvious enterprise is hier-
archical.
X. CONCLUSION
While creative prosecutors will no doubt find a way around
this dilemma, one wonders why it had to become a problem at
all. For years, bribe payers have been prosecuted under RICO
for conducting the affairs of government enterprises whose
affairs they never managed and only controlled at an insignifi-
cant level. The securities salesman who commits fraud in the
sale of securities "carries-on" the affairs of his brokerage house
but he does not manage or control the house. Given the breadth
of RICO and the clear congressional directive to interpret it
broadly, one has to conclude that the Court in Reves adopted
the "management or control" test in order to limit RICO. Such
a policy determination has generally been left by the Court to
Congress. Justice Souter was correct in his analysis; perhaps
some day the Court will reconsider its decision in Reves.
162. 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
RICO 6991994]

